INTERNET SHUTDOWNS DURING PROTESTS: The Case for Stronger Digital Rights Protections in Nigeria ~ By Onyekachi Augustus Nwaozor, Ph.D.
When Chiamaka left her small phone-accessories shop in Lagos on the morning of 1 August 2024, she expected a difficult day. The #EndBadGovernance protests had been announced for days, and many customers had warned that they would stay indoors. What she did not expect was that her main connection to the outside world, her mobile data would become unreliable just as she needed it most.
By midday, messages from suppliers would not load. Her bank app kept spinning. A customer who had promised to transfer money for a bulk order could not confirm payment. “I was not afraid of the protest,” she later told this reporter. “I was afraid of being cut off.”
Her experience captures a growing concern in Nigeria: that network disruptions and social media restrictions during periods of political tension do not only silence protest. They can also obstruct emergency assistance, journalism, business, and the documentation of possible abuses.
The #EndBadGovernance protests began on 1 August 2024, as Nigerians across several states mobilised against inflation, corruption, hardship and the economic consequences of fuel-subsidy removal. The movement was organised largely online, with citizens using X, Instagram, WhatsApp and other platforms to share routes, safety information and demands.
On that first day, many users reported unusually slow internet services. MTN Nigeria’s network was widely reported to have slowed as the protests began, while subscribers across different networks complained that uploads, live videos and messaging apps were difficult to use.
The Federal Government denied ordering telecommunications operators to disrupt services. Bosun Tijani, then Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy, said there was no instruction to tamper with networks and suggested that heavy usage could explain the slow connections.
But 36 civil society organisations disagreed. In a letter to the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Nigerian Communications Commission and the Association of Licensed Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria, they alleged a nationwide throttling of internet speed intended to slow the spread of information. They argued that such disruptions violated constitutional guarantees of expression, assembly and association.
Whether the disruption was deliberate or technical, the effect was real. For hours, citizens struggled to share information at the exact moment when accurate information mattered most.
Digital rights advocates often describe internet access during protests as a public-safety issue, not merely a convenience. A phone is how a protester calls for medical help, tells family members where they are, or shares the location of violence.
During the August 2024 protests, Amnesty International reported that at least 24 protesters were killed, many allegedly shot with live ammunition at close range. Human Rights Watch also documented violence in Abuja, Gombe and Kano, with scores of arrests.
In such an atmosphere, a delayed video, a failed emergency call or an inaccessible map can have consequences far beyond frustration. A protester injured near a crowded junction may depend on someone nearby seeing a message and calling for help. A parent searching for a child may rely on WhatsApp. A volunteer medic may need real-time directions to reach an injured person.
The danger is not theoretical. Nigeria has previously experienced a full social media ban: the federal government suspended Twitter for 222 days in 2021, a period during which small businesses, freelancers, journalists and activists lost a vital channel for communication and income. Research on digital rights in Nigeria notes that the ban caused economic losses and particularly affected small and medium-sized enterprises dependent on the platform.
Network disruptions also make it harder for j ournalists to do their work. Reporting a protest requires more than being physically present. Reporters need to verify videos, contact sources, publish updates and alert editors when conditions become dangerous.
During #EndBadGovernance, media workers faced direct risks as well. The European Union Agency for Asylum documented arrests and physical attacks against journalists covering the protests, including an attack on a Channels Television vehicle carrying about 11 journalists in Kano on 1 August 2024.
CIVICUS reported that at least 56 journalists were attacked, harassed or detained while covering the August 2024 protests. The Committee to Protect Journalists and other press-freedom groups have also raised concerns that Nigeria’s Cybercrimes Act, even after its 2024 amendment, remains broad enough to be used against journalists and online critics.
A journalist who cannot upload footage quickly may lose the chance to preserve evidence. A citizen who records police conduct may be unable to back up the file before their phone is seized. In both cases, the public loses part of the record.
This is why digital rights organisations argue that connectivity during protests should be treated as part of press freedom. If reporters cannot transmit, the public cannot know. If citizens cannot document, accountability becomes harder.
The people least involved in political confrontation often suffer the most from connectivity failures. Market traders, delivery riders, online vendors, POS operators, tailors taking orders through WhatsApp, and young people running small digital businesses all depend on stable mobile data.
For Chiamaka, one slow afternoon meant lost sales and an anxious customer. For a delivery rider, it can mean cancelled orders. For a trader in Onitsha or Aba, it can mean missing a supplier’s message about a price change. For a student selling thrift clothes on Instagram, it can mean losing a buyer to a competitor whose network is working.
The economic damage is especially severe because many Nigerian small businesses operate with thin margins. They do not have advertising budgets or backup systems. Their business is often their phone.
The #EndBadGovernance period also coincided with broader pressure on civic space. Several states declared curfews during the protests, and more than 1,100 people were reportedly arrested. When physical movement is restricted and digital communication is unreliable, ordinary people have fewer ways to protect their livelihoods or seek help.
Concerns about digital restrictions are not limited to Lagos or Abuja. Protest activity and security operations in the Southeast have repeatedly raised questions about how information moves during tense periods. Residents and activists have long complained that heavy security presence, curfews and communication difficulties make it difficult to verify events in real time.
While Nigeria has not recorded a recent nationwide shutdown on the scale of some other countries, Freedom House’s 2025 report noted that Nigerians used #EndBadGovernance to mobilise protests in August and September 2024, while police arrested or detained hundreds of demonstrators. It also recorded more than 30 network disruptions in May 2025, although most were linked to fibre cuts, blackouts, vandalism and infrastructure theft.
That distinction matters. Not every outage is political. But when disruptions repeatedly occur around protests, elections or security operations, citizens are entitled to clear, prompt and independent explanations. Transparency is not an attack on national security; it is a condition for public trust.
Nigeria needs a clear legal and policy framework that makes internet shutdowns and unjustified network throttling exceptional, lawful, necessary and proportionate. At present, citizens are often left to guess whether a disruption is technical, commercial or politically motivated.
Stronger digital rights protection should include:
- A legal presumption against internet shutdowns, with any restriction subject to judicial oversight and strict time limits.
- A duty on the Nigerian Communications Commission to publish prompt, detailed explanations whenever major network disruptions occur.
- Protection for journalists, medics, lawyers and monitors who use digital tools to document protests.
- Clear limits on the use of the Cybercrimes Act, so it cannot be deployed to punish legitimate reporting or online criticism.
- Compensation or regulatory remedies for businesses and individuals who suffer measurable losses from unjustified disruptions.
- Consultation with civil society, telecommunications operators and media organisations before any emergency measure affecting communications.
Digital rights groups, including Paradigm Initiative and partners in the e-RIGHTS project, have argued that deliberately disrupting internet services silences citizens and prevents them from accessing information, engaging in public debate and exercising civic rights.
Nigeria’s young population lives online. They organise, trade, learn, worship, campaign and seek help through their phones. Any government that treats connectivity as a threat misunderstands modern Nigerian life.
The real challenge is not whether citizens will use the internet during protests. They will. The question is whether the state will protect their ability to speak, document, trade and survive—or treat every network connection as a potential security risk.
Chiamaka reopened her shop the next day. Her data connection had improved. But she still keeps a small notebook beside her till, recording orders in case the network fails again.
“I do not want to be against government,” she said. “I only want to be able to work, and to call somebody if something happens.”
That simple demand should not be controversial. In a democracy, the right to communicate is not a luxury. It is a safeguard.
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